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It is often suggested that ambiguity aversion makes individuals more pre-
cautionary, thereby oﬀering a potential explanation for the equity premium
puzzle. We show that this is not true in general. We consider a model in
which risk-and-ambiguity-averse agents can invest in an unambiguously safe
asset and in an ambiguous risky asset. We exhibit some suﬃcient conditions
to guarantee that, ceteris paribus, an increase in ambiguity aversion reduces
the demand for the ambiguous risky asset, and raises the equity premium.
For example, this is the case when the set of plausible distributions of re-
turns can be ranked according to the monotone likelihood ratio order. We
also show how ambiguity aversion distorts the price kernel.
Keywords: smooth ambiguity aversion, monotone likelihood ratio, eq-
uity premium, portfolio choice, price kernel, central dominance.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In many circumstances, it is diﬃcult to assess the precise probability distri-
bution to describe the uncertainty faced by a decision maker (DM). These
situations can be described by a set of plausible priors that contains more
than one distribution. Two schools of thought have proposed an axiomatized
solution to this choice problem. Relying on the Sure Thing Principle, Sav-
age (1954) claims that it is intuitive to expect individuals to form subjective
beliefs on these priors that they will use to measure their expected utility.
In short, agents should be probabilistically sophisticated. This theory of
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) has been subject to criticisms because of
its poor performance to explain observed behaviors in uncertain contexts, as
illustrated by the Ellsberg paradox. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) proposed
an alternative decision criterion that performs better in these contexts. Un-
der their model of ambiguity aversion, for each possible choice ex ante, the
DM computes the expected utility conditional to each possible prior, and
takes the minimum to evaluate the welfare generated by that choice. They
then select the choice that maximizes their welfare. Agents who behave ac-
cording to this maxmin model exhibit a form of choice-sensitive pessimism.
A smooth version of this maxmin expected utility model with multiple priors
has recently been proposed by Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005).
In this paper, as in Chen and Epstein (2002) and in Mukerji, Sheppard
and Tallon (2005), we explore the consequences of ambiguity aversion on
the optimal portfolio allocation and on equilibrium asset prices. We exam-
ine a two-asset model with one safe and unambiguous asset, and another
risky and ambiguous asset. Hansen, Sargent and Tallerini (1999), Chen and
Epstein (2002) and Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) have suggested
that this multiple-priors utility model is helpful to solve the equity premium
1puzzle. This puzzle is based on the observation that the equity premium in
most developed countries during the last century has been around 4 and 6
percents per year, whereas its theoretical level obtained by using the standard
probabilistically sophisticated modeling does not exceed half a percent per
year. In other words, the subjective expected utility model requires an unre-
alistically large degree of risk aversion to explain why households invested so
much in the less risky assets in spite of the large observed equity premium.
Chen and Epstein (2002) suggested that ”part of the [equity] premium is due
to the greater ambiguity associated with the return to equity, which reduces
the required degree of risk aversion” to explain the puzzle. They considered a
model in which the growth process of the economy is surrounded by ambigu-
ity. They obtained an equity premium composed of two positive terms, one
coming from risk aversion, and the other originating from the representative
agent’s ambiguity aversion. Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) consid-
ered a simple numerical example to show that ”ambiguity aversion acts as
a ne x t r ar i s ka v e r s i o n ”.1 Thus, the general idea is that ambiguity aversion
reinforces risk aversion to make people more reluctant to undergo ambiguous
risky acts.2
1They also consider an illustration in which the safe asset is ambiguous, in which case
ambiguity aversion makes the risky asset more attractive. In this paper, we assume that
the safe asset is unambiguous.
2The same idea can be found in the debate on the precautionary principle (O’Riordan
and Cameron (1995), CEC (2000), and Gollier (2001a)).This principle, which appears in
various international texts as in the Conference of Rio on Environment and Development
or the Maastricht Treaty. It states that ”lack of full scientiﬁc certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-eﬀective measures to prevent environmental degradation”.
This principle has widely been interpreted as a recommendation for reducing the collec-
tive risk exposure in the presence of ambiguous probabilities. In short, ambiguity aversion
should make us behave in a more risk-averse way. It has frequently been used in Europe
against genetically modiﬁed organisms, or for an increase in the eﬀort to reduce emissions
of greenhouse gases. Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000) examine these questions by consid-
ering an environmental decision problem that is equivalent to the portfolio choice model
considered in this paper.
2The starting point of this paper is that it is generally not true that am-
biguity aversion reinforces the eﬀect of risk aversion to induce a reduction
in the demand for the ambiguous risky asset. For cleverly chosen - but still
not spurious - multiple-priors for the return of the risky asset, we show that
the introduction of ambiguity aversion increases the investor’s demand for
the risky asset. The intuition for why such counterexamples may exist can
be explained as follows. Ambiguity aversion implies that the DM selects the
relevant prior for the optimal choice in a more pessimistic way than what the
probabilistically sophisticated DM would do. For example, if the DM has two
possible priors, one being riskier than the other in the sense of Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970), the ambiguity-averse maxmin DM will use the riskier
distribution for the excess return, whereas the subjective-expected-utility-
maximizer DM will use a less risky distribution. How does this diﬀerentiated
choice of priors aﬀect the demand for the risky asset? This question was
ﬁrst raised by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), who showed that an increase
in the riskiness of the risky asset does not necessarily reduce the demand for
it by all risk-averse agents. Consequently, it is not generally true that the
ambiguity-averse DM will have a smaller demand for the risky asset than the
ambiguity-neutral one.
The main objective of the paper is to characterize conditions under which
ambiguity aversion reduces the optimal exposure to uncertainty. This can be
done by restricting either the set of utility functions and/or the set of possi-
b l ep r i o r s .I fw ea s s u m et h a tt h es e to fp r i o r sc a nb er a n k e da c c o r d i n gt ot h e
ﬁrst-degree or second-degree stochastic dominance orders (FSD/SSD), we
exhibit some simple suﬃcient conditions on the utility function to obtain the
comparative static property of the introduction of ambiguity aversion. This
result is derived from the observation that, when determining whether to
purchase more or less of the risky asset than the SEU agent, the ambiguity-
3averse agent will use a an implicit distribution for the risky asset that is
FSD or SSD dominated by the distribution used by the probabilistically so-
phisticated agent. This observation allows us to reinterpret the eﬀect of
ambiguity aversion as the eﬀect of a FSD/SSD shift in beliefs in the stan-
dard expected utility model. We then rely on some suﬃcient conditions on
the utility function existing in the EU literature that guarantee that these
diﬀerences in implicit beliefs yield a reduction in the demand for the risky
asset. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), Fishburn and Porter (1976) and Hadar
and Seo (1990) provided these suﬃcient conditions. By restricting the set
of possible beliefs, we are able to relax these conditions on the utility func-
tions. This is in line with the EU literature on the eﬀect of a change in
beliefs on the demand for equity (Eeckhoudt and Hansen (1980), Meyer and
Ormiston (1985), Black and Bulkley (1989), Dionne, Eeckhoudt and Gol-
lier (1993), Athey (2002)). Gollier (1995) characterized the stochastic order
that guarantees that the change in the distribution of the risky asset return
yields a reduction of the optimal risk exposure by all risk-averse investors. A
change in riskiness that satisﬁes this comparative static property is said to
be centrally dominated (CD). As explained earlier, second-degree stochastic
dominance (SSD) does not imply CD. Gollier (1995) and Chateauneuf and
Lakhnati (2005) also showed that CD does not implies SSD. Gollier (1997)
exhibited the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a change in the distrib-
ution of the growth of the economy to raise the equity premium. Unaware
of this literature, Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (2000) and Abel (2002) more
recently reexamined these questions.
In the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e r ,w ee x a m i n et h ee ﬀect of ambiguity aversion
on the demand for the risky asset by an agent who takes prices as given. The
decision model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 provides a counterex-
ample in which an increase in ambiguity aversion raises the demand for the
4ambiguous risky asset. In Section 4, we review the literature on the eﬀect
of a change in beliefs on the demand for the risky asset in the standard EU
model. In Section 5, we show that an increase in ambiguity aversion has
an eﬀect on the demand for the risky asset that is qualitatively equivalent
to a change in beliefs in the EU model. We show that if the set of plausi-
ble distributions can be ranked according to the FSD (SSD) order, then an
increase in ambiguity aversion deteriorates the implicit beliefs in the sense
of the FSD (SSD) order. We use these observations in Section 6 to obtain
suﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o rt h ec o m p a r a t i v e static property of more ambiguity
aversion. In the second part of the paper (Sections 7 and 8), we examine a
Lucas economy with a representative agent facing ambiguous probabilities.
We show how the ambiguity aversion of the representative agent aﬀects the
equity premium, the price kernel of the economy, and individual asset prices.
2 The multiple-priors utility model applied
to the portfolio problem
Our model is static with two assets. The ﬁrst asset is safe and unambiguous
with a rate of return that is normalized to zero. The risky asset has a return
x whose distribution is ambiguous in the sense that it is sensitive to some
parameter θ whose true value is unknown. The investor is initially endowed
with wealth w0.I f h e i n v e s t s α in the risky asset, his ﬁnal wealth will be
w0 + αx conditional to a realized return x of the risky asset.
The ambiguity of the risky asset is characterized by a set Π = {F1,...,Fn}
of subjectively plausible cumulative probability distributions for e x.L e t e xθ
denote the random variable distributed as Fθ. Based on his subjective infor-
mation, the investor associates a probability distribution (q1,...,qn)o v e rΠ,
with Σn
θ=1qi =1 , where qθ ≥ 0 is the subjective probability that Fθ bethe true
5probability distribution of excess returns. We hereafter denote e θ for the ran-
dom variable (1,q 1;2;q2;...;n,qn). Following Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Muk-
erji (2005), we assume that the preferences of the investor exhibit smooth am-
biguity aversion. For each plausible probability distribution Fθ, the investor
computes the expected utility U(α,θ)=Eu(w0+αe xθ)=
R
u(w0+αx)dFθ(x)
conditional to Fθ being the true distribution. We assume that u is increasing
and concave, so that U(.,θ) is concave in the investment α in the risky asset,
for all θ. Ex ante, for a given portfolio allocation α, the welfare of the agent
is measured by V (α)w i t h
φ(V (α)) =
n X
θ=1
qθφ(U(α,θ)) =
n X
θ=1
qθφ(Eu(w0 + αe xθ)),
The shape of φ describes the investor’s attitude towards ambiguity (or pa-
rameter uncertainty). V (α) can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent
of the uncertain conditional expected utility U(α, e θ). A linear φ means that
the investor is neutral to ambiguity. In such a case, the DM is indiﬀerent
to any mean-preserving spread of U(α, e θ), and V (α) can be represented by
a subjective expected utility functional V SEU(α)=Eu(w0 + αe x), where e x
is the random variable that is distributed as (e x1,q 1;...;e xn,q n). On the con-
trary, a concave φ is synonymous of ambiguity aversion in the sense that the
DM dislikes any mean-preserving spread of the conditional expected utility
U(α, e θ).
An interesting particular case arises when the absolute ambiguity aversion
η(U)=−φ00(U)/φ0(U) is constant, so that φ(U)=−η−1 exp(−ηU). As
proved by Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), the ex ante welfare V (α)
tends to maxmin expected utility functional V MEU(α)=m i n θ Eu(w0 +αe xθ)
w h e nt h ed e g r e eo fa b s o l u t ea m b i g u i t ya v e r s i o nφ tends to inﬁnity. Thus,
the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s maxmin criteria is a special case of this
model.
6The optimal portfolio allocation α∗ maximizes the ex ante welfare of the
investor V (α). Because φ is increasing, α∗ is the solution of the following
program:
α
∗ ∈ argmax
α
n X
θ=1
qθφ(Eu(w0 + αe xθ)). (1)
If φ and u are strictly concave, the objective function is concave in α and the
solution to program (1), when it exists, is unique.
To illustrate, consider the following special case. Suppose that the plau-
sible distributions e xθ are all normally distributed with the same variance σ2,
and with Ee xθ = θ.3 Suppose also that the investor’s preferences exhibit con-
stant absolute risk aversion −u00(z)/u0(z)=A, i.e., u(z)=−A−1 exp−Az.
As is well-known, this implies that the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact.4
This implies in turn that
U(α,θ)=−A
−1 exp−A
¡
w0 + αθ − 0.5Aα
2σ
2¢
∈ R−. (2)
Moreover, suppose that φ exhibits constant relative ambiguity aversion on the
relevant domain of U,w h i c hi sR−. This means that φ(U)=−(−U)1+γ/(1+
γ). This function is increasing in R− and is concave in this domain if γ is
positive. Under this speciﬁc a t i o n ,w eh a v et h a t
V (α)=−A
−1 ¡
exp−A(w0 − 0.5Aα
2σ
2)
¢³
E exp−A(1 + γ)αe θ
´1/(1+γ)
.
(3)
In order to get an analytical solution to this problem, suppose that the
parameter uncertainty on the equity premium θ is also normal, in the sense
that e θ is normally distributed with mean μ0 and variance σ2
0. This latter
parameter is a measure of the degree of ambiguity faced by the investor.
3It is easy to extend this to the case of an ambiguous variance of returns.
4For a simple proof, see for example Gollier (2001b, page 57).
7Using again the property that the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact for
exponential functions and normal distributions, we obtain that
E exp−A(1 + γ)αe θ =e x p−A(1 + γ)α(μ0 − 0.5A(1 + γ)ασ
2
0). (4)
Combining these two formulas yields
V (α)=−A
−1 exp−A(w0 + αμ0 − 0.5Aα
2(σ
2 +( 1+γ)σ
2
0)). (5)
The optimal demand for the risky asset is thus equal to
α
∗ =
μ0
A(σ2 +( 1+γ)σ2
0)
. (6)
We see that, when the risky asset is ambiguous (σ2
0 > 0), the demand for the
risky asset is decreasing in the relative degree γ of ambiguity aversion of the
investor. In this example, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion go into the
same direction. Compared to the ambiguity neutral agent (γ =0 ) ,a m b i g u i t y
aversion γ>0 has an eﬀect on the demand for the ambiguous risky asset
that is equivalent to increasing absolute risk aversion by 100γσ2
0/(σ2 + σ2
0)
%.
3 An example in which more ambiguity-averse
agents raise their demand for the ambigu-
ous asset
T h ea b o v ee x a m p l et o g e t h e rw i t ht h eﬁndings by Chen and Epstein (2002),
Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) and Mukerji, Sheppard and Tallon
(2005) suggest that ambiguity aversion reinforces risk aversion in situations
where the more risky actions are also more ambiguous. In this section, we
show that this intuitive idea is not true in general.
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Figure 1: The conditional distributions of the excess return of the risky asset
in the counterexample.
In our counterexample, there are only n = 2 plausible distribution func-
tions F1 and F2 for the excess return of the risky asset. The corresponding
conditional distributions are depicted in Figure 1. It is easy to check that
e x1 is riskier than e x2 in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Indeed,
e x1 is obtained from e x2 by adding the zero-mean noises (−0.25,3/4;0.75,1/4)
and (−0.25,1/2;0.25,1/2) conditional to respectively x2 =0a n dx2 =1 .I n
addition, given all available information, investors believe that the less risky
distribution F1 has a probability q1 = 5% to be the true distribution.
The investor’s attitude toward risk is represented by the following concave
utility function:
u(z)=
½
zi f z ≤ 3
3+0 .3(z − 3) if z > 3 (7)
Moreover, the investor’s attitude towards ambiguity is characterized by con-
9stant absolute risk tolerance η :
φ(U)=−
exp−ηU
η
. (8)
Finally, the investor’s ﬁnal wealth equals w0 =2 .W eh a v ed r a w ni nF i g u r e
2t h ee xa n t ew e l f a r eV of the investor as a function of the investment α in
the risky asset for various non-negative degrees η of ambiguity aversion. As
expected, V is concave in α, and an increase in ambiguity aversion yields a
downward shift in welfare, for all α 6= 0. In Figure 3, we reported the demand
α∗ for the risky asset as a function of η, the constant ambiguity aversion of
the investor. Because of the kink at α =1o ft h eV curves for small values
of η, the introduction of a small degree of ambiguity aversion has no eﬀect
on the demand for the risky asset, which is equal to α∗ =1 .H o w e v e r ,a b o v e
a threshold ηmin approximately equal to 20, the introduction of ambiguity
aversion increases α∗ above the optimal investment of the ambiguity-neutral
investor, and the demand for the risky and ambiguous asset is increasing in
the degree of ambiguity aversion.W h e n η tends to inﬁnity — a case that
correspond to the Gilboa and Schmeidler’s maxmin model, the optimal in-
vestment in the risky asset tends to α∗ =4 /3. T h ea m b i g u i t y - a v e r s em a x m i n
investor has a demand for the risky asset that is 33% larger than the demand
of the ambiguity-neutral one!
Let us more speciﬁcally compare the demands of respectively the maxmin
investor (η =+ ∞) and the ambiguity-neutral one (η =0 ) .B e c a u s eo fh i sr i s k
aversion, the maxmin agent behaves as if the riskier distribution F1 would be
certain, in which case the optimal investment is α∗ =4 /3. On the contrary,
the ambiguity-neutral investor behaves as if the distribution of excess returns
would be FSEU =( F1,5%;F2,95%), w h i c hi sl e s sr i s k yt h a nF1 in the sense
of Rothschild and Stiglitz. The reader can check that, conditional to beliefs
FSEU, the optimal investment in the risky asset equals α∗ =1 . In spite of
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Figure 3: The demand for the risky asset as a function of the degree η of
absolute ambiguity aversion.
11subjectively perceiving a safer risky asset, the ambiguity-neutral DM invests
less in it. This comment enlights the link between the eﬀect of ambiguity
aversion on the demand for the risky asset, and the eﬀect of an increase in
the riskiness of the risky asset on the demand for it in the classical SEU
model. Because it is not true in general that this increase in risk reduces the
demand for the risky asset in that SEU model, it is not true in general that
ambiguity aversion reduces this demand, both in the maxmin MEU model
and its smooth version.
4 A short overview of the literature on the
eﬀect of a change in risk on the demand
for the risky asset
In this section, we consider the ambiguity-free version of the portfolio problem
presented in section 2. If the investor believes that the distribution of excess
returns is e xa, the optimal investment α∗
a in the risky asset is such that
Ee xau
0(w0 + α
∗
ae xa)=0 . (9)
Without loss of generality, let us assume that Ee xa is positive, which implies
that α∗
a is positive.5 Consider a change in beliefs from e xa to another random
variable e xb. Because Eu(w0 + αe xb)i sc o n c a v ei nα, the optimal investment
α∗
b in the risky asset is less than α∗
a if and only if
Ee xbu
0(w0 + α
∗
ae xb) ≤ 0. (10)
Let us ﬁrst explain why SSD is neither necessary nor suﬃcient to guar-
antee that (9) implies (10), i.e., that the demand is reduced. Normalizing α∗
a
5If Ee xa is negative, replace e x by −e x and α by −α.
12to unity, condition (10) can be rewritten as
Ee xbu
0(w0 + e xb) ≤ Ee xau
0(w0 + e xa), (11)
As observed by Hadar and Seo (1990), condition (11) would be satisﬁed when
e xb is SSD-dominated by e xa if function h(x)=xu0(w0 + x)i si n c r e a s i n ga n d
concave in x. Assuming that u is three times continuously diﬀerentiable,
observe that
h
0(x)=u
0(w0 + x)[1− R(w0 + x)+w0A(w0 + x)],
where A(z)=−u00(z)/u0(z)a n dR(z)=zA(z) are respectively the absolute
and relative risk aversion of the investor. Observe that a suﬃcient condition
for h to be nondecreasing is that relative risk aversion be less than unity. We
can also check that
h
00(x)=−u
00(w0 + x)[(P
r(w0 + x) − 2) − w0P(w0 + x)]
where P(z)=−u000(z)/u00(z)a n dPr(z)=zP(z) are respectively absolute
and relative prudence (Kimball (1990)). This condition implies that h is
concave if relative prudence is less than 2, and prudence is positive. These
ﬁndings can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the vNM utility function u is three times con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable. Then, a change in beliefs on the excess return from
e xa to e xb implies inequality (11), i.e., it reduces the demand in the risky asset,
if condition 1 or 2 is satisﬁed:
1. e xb is riskier than e xa in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz, and relative
prudence is positive and less than 2;
2. e xb is dominated by e xa in the sense of First-degree Stochastic Dominance
(FSD), and relative risk aversion is less than unity.
13None of these suﬃcient conditions is really satisfactory. Starting with
condition 2, it is often claimed that relative risk aversion is larger than unity.
Arguments have been provided based on introspection (Dr` eze (1981), Kandel
and Stambaugh (1991), Gollier (2001)) or on the equity premium puzzle
that can be solved in the canonical model only with a degree of relative
risk aversion exceeding 40. A similar problem arises for condition 1, which
requires that relative prudence be positive and less than 2. The positiveness of
relative prudence relies on the observation that agents are prudent, i.e., that
they raises their saving rate when their future incomes become riskier. The
problem with condition 1 comes from the requirement that relative prudence
be less than 2. Because Pr(z)=1+R(z) when relative risk aversion is
constant — a classical assumption in macroeconomics and ﬁnance — Pr ≤ 2
is equivalent to R ≤ 1f o rt h a ts p e c i ﬁcation of the utility function. Thus,
condition Pr ≤ 2 seems as unrealistic as condition R ≤ 1.
Rather than limiting the set of utility functions yielding an unambiguous
eﬀect of a FSD (SSD) change in beliefs, an alternative approach consists in
searching for the set of changes in beliefs that yield an unambiguous reduction
in the demand for the risky asset by all risk-averse investors. To do this, let
us ﬁrst introduce the following concepts, which rely on the location-weighted-
probability functions Ta and Tb that are deﬁned as follows:
Ta(x)=
Z x
x−
tdFa(t)a n d Tb(x)=
Z x
x−
tdFb(t), (12)
where Fa and Fb are the cumulative distribution functions of e xa and e xb whose
supports are assumed to be bounded in [x−,x +].
Deﬁnition 1 Consider two random variables (e xa,e xb) with support in [x−,x +]
and Ee xa > 0. We say that random variable e xb is dominated by e xa in the
sense of Linear Stochastic Dominance of factor m,i . e . ,e xb ¹LSD(m) e xa, if
14Tb(x) ≤ mTa(x) for all x in [x−,x +]. We say that e xb is centrally dominated
(CD) by e xa, i.e., e xb ¹CD e xa, if there exists a nonnegative scalar m such that
e xb ¹LSD(m) e xa.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Ee xa is positive. All risk-averse investors re-
duce their demand for the risky asset due to a change in beliefs from e xa to
e xb i fa n do n l yi fe xb is centrally dominated by e xa.
Proof: The proof is essentially in Gollier (1995). Observe that we re-
stricted the deﬁnition of CD to the set of LSD with a nonnegative factor
m. When assuming that Ee xa > 0, this is without loss of generality. In-
deed, under this condition, if e xb is dominated by e xa in the sense of LSD
with a negative m,i tm u s tb et h a ti ti sa l s od o m i n a t e di nt h es e n s eo fL S D
of factor 0. This claim is proved as follows: Suppose that e xb ¹LSD(m) e xa
with m<0. This implies in particular that Tb(x+) ≤ mTa(x+), or equiva-
lently that Ee xb ≤ mEe xa, which is nonpositive. Because Tb is ﬁrst decreasing
a n dt h e ni n c r e a s i n gw i t hTb(x−)=0 , the fact that Tb(x+) ≤ 0 implies that
Tb(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [x−,x +]. This implies in turn that e xb is dominated by
e xa in the sense of LSD(0). Thus, there is no restriction to limit the search
of factor m to the set of nonnegative scalars.¥
SSD-dominance is not suﬃcient for CD-dominance. The numerical illus-
tration presented in the previous section illustrates this fact. Indeed, e x1 is
SSD-dominated by e x2,b u te x1 is not centrally riskier than e x2.T h i so b s e r v a t i o n
is at the origin of our counterexample.
Here is a partial list of stochastic orders that have been shown to belong
to CD:
• Strong Increase in Risk (Meyer and Ormiston (1985)): The excess re-
turn e xb is a strong increase in risk with respect to e xa if they have the
15same mean and if any probability mass taken out of some of the real-
izations of e xa is transferred out of the support of this random variable.6
• Simple Increase in Risk (Dionne and Gollier (1992)): Random variable
e xb is a simple increase in risk with respect to e xa if they have the same
mean and x(Fa(x) − Fb(x)) is nonnegative for all x.7
• Monotone Likelihood Ratio order (MLR) (Milgrom (1981), Landsberger
and Meilijson (1990) and Ormiston and Schlee (1993)): We say that
e xb is dominated by e xa in the sense of MLR if there exists a scalar c
in [x−,x +] and a nonincreasing function r such that Fa(x)=0f o ra l l
x<cand Fb(x)=Fb(c)+
R x
c r(t)dFa(t) for all x ≥ c.N o t i c et h a tM L R
is a subset of FSD.
• Monotone Probability Ratio order (MPR) (Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995),
Athey (2002)): When the two random variables have the same support,
we say that e xb is dominated by e xa in the sense of MPR if the cumu-
lative probability ratio Fb(x)/Fa(x)i sn o n i n c r e a s i n g .I tc a nb es h o w n
that MPR is more general than MLR, but is still a subset of FSD:
MLR⇒ MPR⇒ FSD.
5E ﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s eo fa m b i g u i t ya v e r s i o n
The beliefs of investors is represented by the set of marginals (e x1,...,e xn)o f
the excess return of the risky asset, together with the a priori distribution
(q1,...,qn) on these marginals. We compare two agents with the same beliefs
and the same concave utility function u, with u0 ≥ 0a n du00 ≤ 0, but with
6See also Eeckhoudt and Hansen (1980), Black and Bulkley (1989), Dionne, Eeckhoudt
and Gollier (1993).
7Chateauneuf and Lakhani (2005) propose a generalized concept that combines the
features of strong and simple increases in risk.
16diﬀerent attitudes toward ambiguity represented by concave functions φ1 and
φ2. The demand for the risky asset by agent φ1 is expressed by α∗
1 which
must satisfy the following ﬁrst-order condition:
φ
0
1(V1(α
∗
1))V
0
1(α
∗
1)=
n X
θ=1
qθφ
0
1(U(α
∗
1,θ))Ee xθu
0(w0 + α
∗
1e xθ)=0 .
(13)
Because U(0,θ)=u(w0)a n dUα(0,θ)=u0(w0)Ee xθ, we see that V 0
1(0) =
ΣθqθEe xθ. By the concavity of V1,t h i si m p l i e st h a tα∗
1 must have the same sign
than the unconditional expectation of the excess return, ΣθqθEe xθ.N o t i c e
that we can rewrite the above condition as
Ee y1u
0(w0 + α
∗
1e y1)=0 , (14)
where e y1 is a compound random variable which equals e xθ with probability
b q1
θ, θ =1 ,...,n, such that
b q
1
θ =
qθφ0
1(U(α∗
1,θ))
Pn
t=1 qtφ0
1(U(α∗
1,t))
. (15)
Thus, the ambiguity-averse agent φ1 b e h a v e sa saS E Ua g e n tw h ow o u l d
distort his beliefs from (q1,...,qn) to the ”implicit probability distribution”
(b q1
1,..., b q1
n). Notice that the distortion functional described by equation (15)
is endogenous, as it depends upon the portfolio allocation α∗
1 selected by the
agent.
Following Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), we assume that the
agent with function φ2 is more ambiguity-averse than agent φ1 in the sense
that there exists an increasing and concave transformation function k such
that φ2(U)=k(φ1(U)) for all U in the relevant domain. We would like
to characterize conditions under which the more ambiguity-averse agent φ2
has a smaller demand for the risky asset than agent φ1: α∗
2 ≤ α∗
1.B yt h e
17concavity of V2, this would be the case if and only if
n X
θ=1
qθφ
0
2(U(α
∗
1,θ))Ee xθu
0(w0 + α
∗
1e xθ) ≤ 0. (16)
As for agent φ1, this condition can be rewritten as
Ee y2u
0(w0 + α
∗
1e y2) ≤ 0, (17)
where e y2 is a compound random variable which equals e xθ with probability
b q2
θ, θ =1 ,...,n, such that
b q
2
θ =
qθφ0
2(U(α∗
1,θ))
Pn
t=1 qtφ0
2(U(α∗
1,t))
. (18)
To sum up, the change in preferences from (u,φ1)t o( u,φ2) reduces the de-
mand for the risky asset if (14) implies (17). By analogy to what has been
done in the previous section, we obtain the following lemma. It builds a
bridge between our comparative static analysis in this paper and the litera-
ture on the comparative statics of a change in risk in the SEU model.
Lemma 1 The change in preferences from (u,φ1) to (u,φ2) reduces the de-
mand for the risky asset if the SEU agent with utility function u reduces his
demand for the risky asset when his beliefs about the excess return shift from
e y1 ∼ (e x1, b q1
1;...;e xn, b q1
n) to e y2 ∼ (e x1, b q2
1;...;e xn, b q2
n).
It is important to notice that agent φ2 does actually not use beliefs b q2
to determine his optimal portfolio allocation, but knowing b q2 is enough to
determine whether his demand for the risky asset is smaller than α∗
1.I ti sn o w
useful to examine how agents φ1 and φ2 diﬀerentially distort their implicit
probability distribution to determine whether α∗
2 is smaller than α∗
1.Aﬁrst
answer to this question is provided by the following result.
18Lemma 2 Rank the set of marginals so that U(α∗
1,1) ≤ U(α∗
1,2) ≤ ... ≤
U(α∗
1,n). The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. Agent φ2 is more ambiguity-averse than agent φ1, i.e., there exists a
concave function k such that φ2(U)=k(φ1(U)) for all U;
2. Beliefs b q2 is dominated by b q1 in the sense of the monotone likelihood
ratio order, for any set of marginals (e x1,...,e xn) satisfying the above-
mentioned ranking.
Proof: Because φ1 and φ2 are increasing in U, there exists an increasing
function k such that φ2(U)=k(φ1(U)), or φ0
2(U)=k0(φ1(U))φ0
1(U)f o ra l l
U.U s i n gd e ﬁnition (15) and (18), we obtain that
b q2
θ
b q1
θ
= k
0(φ1(U(α
∗
1,θ))
Pn
t=1 qtφ0
1 (U(α∗
1,t))
Pn
t=1 qtφ0
2 (U(α∗
1,t))
(19)
for all θ =1 ,...,n. The Lemma is a direct consequence of (19), in the sense
that the likelihood ratio b q2
θ/b q1
θ is decreasing in θ if k0 is decreasing in φ1. ¥
An increase in ambiguity aversion is characterized by the MLR-dominated
shift in the prior beliefs. In other words, it biases beliefs by favoring the worse
marginals in a very speciﬁcs e n s e :i fa g e n tφ1 prefers marginal e xθ than mar-
ginal e xθ0, then, compared to agent φ1, the more ambiguity-averse agent φ2
increases the implicit prior probability b q2
θ0 relatively more than the implicit
prior probability b q2
θ. L e m m a2p r o v i d e saj u s t i ﬁcation to say that more
ambiguity aversion is equivalent to more pessimism, i.e., to a MLR deteri-
oration of beliefs. To be more precise, more ambiguity aversion and more
pessimim share the same comparative static direction. This result is central
to prove our next proposition, in which we consider three dominance orders:
ﬁrst-degree stochastic dominance (D1 =FSD), second-degree stochastic dom-
inance (D2 =SSD), and Rothschild and Stiglitz’s increase in risk (D3 =IR).
19Proposition 3 Suppose that the expected excess return of the risky asset is
positive. Suppose that the set of marginals (e x1,...,e xn) can be ranked according
the stochastic order Di,i=1 ,2, or 3 . It implies that an increase in ambiguity
aversion deteriorates the implicit probability distribution of the return of the
risky asset in the sense of the stochastic order Di.I ns h o r t ,i f∃k concave:
φ2 = k(φ1) and e x1 ¹Di e x2 ¹Di ... ¹Di e xn, then
e y2 ∼ (e x1, b q
2
1;...;e xn, b q
2
n) ¹Di (e x1, b q
1
1;...;e xn, b q
1
n) ∼ e y1.
Proof: Suppose that e x1 ¹Di e x2 ¹Di ... ¹Di e xn. It implies that U(α∗
1,1) ≤
U(α∗
1,2) ≤ ... ≤ U(α∗
1,n). We have to prove that (e x1, b q1
1;....;e xn, b q1
n)i sp r e -
ferred to (e x1, b q2
1;....;e xn, b q2
n) by all utility functions v in Ci,t h a ti s
n X
θ=1
b q
2
θEv(e xθ) ≤
n X
θ=1
b q
1
θEv(e xθ),
where C1 is the set of increasing functions, C2 is the set of increasing and
concave functions, and C3 is the set of concave functions. By assumption,
Ev(e xθ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nθ. The above inequality is obtained by combining
this property with the fact that b q2 is dominated by b q1 in the sense of MLR
(Lemma 2), a special case of FSD. ¥
This is an important result, which states that, to determine whether he
should reduce his demand for the risky asset compared to agent φ1, agent
φ2 uses an implicit probability distribution e y2 for the excess return that is
either FSD, SSD or IR dominated by the distribution e y1 used by agent φ1 to
determine his own optimal investment. To illustrate, if the marginals can be
ranked according to the IR stochastic order, as in our counterexample, then
the more ambiguity-averse agents will use a riskier implicit distribution for
the excess return.
206 W h e nd o e sa ni n c r e a s ei na m b i g u i t ya v e r -
sion reduce the demand for the risky asset?
The following proposition combines the results presented in Propositions 1
and 3.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the vNM utility function u is three times con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable, and that the unconditional expectation of excess re-
turns is positive. Any increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for
the risky asset if one of the following two conditions is satisﬁed:
1. The set of marginals (e x1,...,e xn) can be ranked according to the Roth-
schild and Stiglitz’s riskiness order, and relative prudence is positive
and less than 2;
2. The set of marginals (e x1,...,e xn) can be ranked according ﬁrst-degree
stochastic dominance, and relative risk aversion is less than unity.
More generally, if the set of marginals can be ranked according to the
SSD order, an increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for the
risky asset if relative risk aversion is less than unity, and relative prudence
is positive and less than two. As said before these conditions are not very
convincing. Therefore, an alternative strategy would consist in restricting the
set of priors rather than the investor’s attitude towards risk.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the unconditional expectation of excess returns
is positive. Any increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for the
risky asset if the set of marginals (e x1,...,e xn) can be ranked according to
both Second-degree Stochastic Dominance and Central Dominance, that is, if
e xθ ¹SSD e xθ+1 and e xθ ¹CD e xθ+1 for all θ =1 ,...,n− 1.
21Proof: See the Appendix. ¥
We can exploit this result by relying on the literature on the comparative
statics of a change in risk. To illustrate, because we know that MLR yields
both ﬁrst-degree stochastic dominance and central riskiness, we directly ob-
tain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the set of marginals (e x1,...,e xn) can be ranked ac-
cording to the monotone likelihood ratio order, and that the unconditional
expectation of excess return is positive. Then, any increase in ambiguity
aversion reduces the demand for the risky asset.
In this case, we conclude that ambiguity aversion and risk aversion goes
into the same direction. A more general corollary holds where the MLR order
is replaced by the more general MPR order. We also obtain the same result
if marginals can be ranked according to the strong riskiness order, or to the
simple riskiness order, or to any mixture of these stochastic orders, as stated
in Proposition 5.
7 The equity premium
We can use these results to determine the eﬀect of ambiguity aversion on
the equity premium. Consider two Lucas tree economies, i =1 ,2, with
a risk-averse and ambiguity-averse representative agent whose preferences
are characterized by increasing and concave functions (u,φi). Each agent
is endowed with a tree producing an uncertainty quantity of fruits at the
end of the period. The distribution of fruits is subject to some parameter
uncertainty. Parameter θ can take value 1,...,n with probabilities (q1,...,qn).
Let e cθ denotes the random variable of fruits conditional on θ. Ex ante, there
is a market for trees. The unit (future) price of trees is denoted P.T h e
22problem of the representative agent is to determine which share α of her tree
should be sold ex ante:
max
α φ
−1
i
"
n X
θ=1
qθφi(Eu(e cθ + α(P − e cθ)))
#
. (20)
The ﬁrst-order condition is written as
n X
θ=1
qθφ
0
i(Eu(e cθ + α
∗
i(P − e cθ)))E [(P −e cθ)u
0(e cθ + α
∗
i(P − e cθ))] = 0.
(21)
The market-clearing condition requires that α∗
i =0 , which yields the follow-
ing pricing formula for the equilibrium price Pi of trees in the economy:
n X
θ=1
qθφ
0
i(Eu(e cθ))E [(e cθ − Pi)u
0(e cθ)] = 0,
or, equivalently,
Pi =
Pn
θ=1 qθφ0
i(Eu(e cθ))E [e cθu0(e cθ)]
Pn
θ=1 qθφ0
i(Eu(e cθ))Eu0(e cθ)
. (22)
It implies that the equity premium equals
ψi =
[
Pn
θ=1 qθEe cθ][
Pn
θ=1 qθφ0
i(Eu(e cθ))Eu0(e cθ)]
Pn
θ=1 qθφ0
i(Eu(e cθ))E [e cθu0(e cθ)]
− 1. (23)
Suppose that the representative agent in economy i = 2 is more ambiguity-
averse than in economy i = 1 in the sense of Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci and Mukerji
(2005). Does it imply a reduction in the equilibrium price of trees (P2 ≤ P1)
and, therefore an increase in the equity premium (ψ2 ≥ ψ1)? From our earlier
results in this paper, it is without surprise that the answer to this question is
ambiguous, since an increase in ambiguity aversion does not necessarily imply
a reduction in the demand for the ambiguous trees. Here is a counterexam-
ple. Suppose that there are only two plausible distributions e c1 =2+e x1
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Figure 4: The equity premium ψ (in percent) has a function of the degree η
of ambiguity aversion.
and e c2 =2+e x2 for the production of fruits per tree, where e x1 and e x2 are
described in Figure 1. The beliefs of the representative agents are such that
q1 =1− q2 = 5%. The utility function u is the piecewise speciﬁcation
(7), whereas function φi exhibits constant absolute ambiguity aversion ηi.
In Figure 4, we depicted the equity premium as a function of the degree
η of absolute ambiguity aversion. The equity premium is smaller in more
ambiguity-averse economies. The Savagian ambiguity-neutral economy has
an equity premium equaling ψ =2 2 .1%, whereas the Gilboa-Schmeidler
maxmin economy has an equity premium equaling ψ =1 0 .4%.
Because the left-hand side of the pricing formula (22) is decreasing in
the price Pi, we obtain that P2 is smaller than P1 if and only the following
inequality holds:
n X
θ=1
qθφ
0
2(Eu(e cθ))E [(e cθ − P1)u
0(e cθ)] ≤ 0, (24)
where P1 is deﬁned by (22) for i = 1. Technically, this condition is equivalent
24to condition (16) with e cθ = w0 + α∗
1e xθ, α∗
1 =1a n dP1 = w0.W e c o n c l u d e
this section with the following proposition, which is a direct consequence of
this observation together with the results presented in the previous section.
Proposition 6 An increase in ambiguity aversion raises the equity premium
if one of the following conditions is satisﬁed:
1. The set of marginals (e c1,...,e cn) can be ranked according to the Roth-
schild and Stiglitz’s riskiness order, and relative prudence is positive
and less than 2;
2. The set of marginals (e c1,...,e cn) can be ranked according ﬁrst-degree sto-
chastic dominance, and relative risk aversion is less than unity;
3. The set of marginals (e c1 − P1,...,e cn − P1) can be ranked according
to both Second-degree Stochastic Dominance and Central Dominance,
where P1 is the initial price of equity.
Notice that, contrary to SSD, central dominance is location-sensitive, in
the sense that e c1 ¹CD e c2 does not necessarily imply that e c1 − P1 ¹CD e c2 −
P2.8 However, several stochastic orders belonging to CD that we considered
earlier in this paper are insensitive to the location of P1.T h i si st h ec a s ei n
particular for the MLR order, for the MPR order and for strong increases
in risk. This implies for example that the equity premium is increasing
in the degree of ambiguity aversion of the representative agent if the set of
marginals (e c1,...,e cn) can be ranked according to the MLR order.
8Gollier (1997) deﬁned the notion of Portfolio Dominance (PD) so that e x1 ¹PD e x2 if
and only if e x1 − P ¹CR e x2 − P for all P. PD is stronger than SSD.
258 A s s e tp r i c e si na nA r r o w - D e b r e ue c o n o m y
In this section, we extend the focus of our analysis to the eﬀect of ambiguity
aversion to the price of any Arrow-Debreu asset. In addition to allowing
consumers to sell shares of their tree, we also allow them to trade claims of
fruits contingent on the harvest. Suppose that there is a ﬁnite set of possible
states of nature s =1 ,...,S. T h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ea g e n ti se n d o w e dw i t hcs
fruits in state s, s =1 ,...,S. Assuming complete markets, the ambiguity-
averse and risk-averse agent whose preferences are given by the pair (u,φi)
solves the following problem:
max
(x1,...,xS)
φ
−1
i
"
n X
θ=1
qθφi
Ã
S X
s=1
ps|θu(xs)
!#
, s.t.
S X
s=1
Πs(xs − cs)=0 ,
(25)
where ps|θ is the probability of state s conditional to θ, xs is the demand for
the Arrow-Debreu security associated to state s,a n dΠs is the price of that
asset. The ﬁrst-order conditions for this program are written as
u
0(xs)
"
n X
θ=1
qθφ
0
i
Ã
S X
s0=1
ps0|θu(xs0)
!
ps|θ
#
= λΠs, (26)
for all s, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget con-
straint, which is hereafter normalized to unity. The market-clearing condi-
tions impose that xs = cs for all s, which implies that the following equilib-
rium state prices in economy i :
Π
i
s = b p
i
su
0(cs), (27)
for all s, where the implicit state probability b pi
s is deﬁned as follows:9
b p
i
s =
n X
θ=1
b q
i
θps|θ with b q
i
θ =
qθφ0
i (Eu(e cθ))
Pn
t=1 qtφ0
i (Eu(e ct))
, (28)
9Mukerji, Sheppard and Tallon (2005) were the ﬁrst to make this point.
26where e cθ is distributed as (c1,p 1|θ;...,cS,p S|θ). The aversion to ambiguity of
the representative agent aﬀects the equilibrium state prices in a way that is
equivalent to a distortion of beliefs in the EU model. This distortion takes the
form of a transformation of the subjective prior distribution from (q1,...,q n)
to (b qi
1,..., b qi
n).10 L e m m a2i m p l i e st h a tb q2 is dominated by b q1 in the sense of
MLR when Eu(e c1) ≤ Eu(e c2) ≤ ... ≤ Eu(e cn)a n dφ2 is more ambiguity-averse
than agent φ1. The next proposition is a consequence of this observation.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the set of marginals (e c1,...,e cn) can be ranked
according the stochastic order Di, (Di = FSD, SSD or IR) . It implies
that an increase in ambiguity aversion deteriorates the implicit probability
distribution of consumption in the sense of the stochastic order Di.I n
short, if ∃k concave: φ2 = k(φ1) and e x1 ¹Di e x2 ¹Di ... ¹Di e xn ,t h e n
(e c1, b q2
1;...;e cn, b q2
n) ¹Di (e c1, b q1
1;...;e cn, b q1
n).
Proof: The proof of this proposition is parallel to the proof of Proposition
3. ¥
Thus, if the marginals can be ranked by FSD, an increase in ambigu-
ity aversion yields a change in beliefs about the state probability distribu-
tion that is FSD-deteriorating (SSD-deteriorating). Similarly, an increase in
ambiguity aversion makes the implicit probability distribution riskier if the
marginals can be ranked by the riskiness order of Rothschild and Stiglitz.
The price kernel (πi
1,...πi
S)i sd e ﬁned as the vector of equilibrium state
prices Πi
s per unit of the state probability Σθqθps|θ :
π
i
s =
Πi
s Pn
θ=1 qθps|θ
=
b pi
s Pn
θ=1 qθps|θ
u
0(cs). (29)
10It is noteworthy that, unlike the earlier sections, b q2 is the implicit distorted belief used
for pricing in the EU model with agent 2. This is due to the fact that the equilibrium
conditions impose the same optimal portfolios for economies i =1a n d2 .
27In an economy without ambiguity aversion, it is well-known that the state
price per unit of probability is just a function of the aggregate consumption in
that state. Indeed, in such an economy, b pi
s equals
Pn
θ=1 qθps|θ,a n de q u a t i o n
(29) can be rewritten as πi
s = u0(cs). It is a decreasing function of cs,a
property that directly implies the positive equity premium.
In an economy with ambiguity aversion, this needs not to be the case
anymore. In general, the state price per unit of probability will be a function
of the aggregate consumption in that state, and of the degree of ambiguity
of that state probability. To keep the analysis simple, suppose that cs 6= cs0
for all (s,s0), so that we can substitute index s =1 ,...,n by another index
s = c1,...,cS. We see from (29) that ambiguity aversion adds a second
multiplicative term b pi
s/
Pn
θ=1 qθps|θ to u0(cs) in the pricing kernel. This second
term is aﬀected by an increase in ambiguity aversion that is described by
Proposition 7. Suppose for example that the marginals can be ranked by
the FSD order. Then, an increase in ambiguity aversion tends to transfer
the implicit probability mass b p from the good states to the bad ones. This
implies a clockwise shift in the price kernel, as illustrated in Figure 5a. If the
marginals can be ranked according to their riskiness, an increase in ambiguity
aversion tends to transfer the implicit probability mass to the extreme states.
This implies convexifying the price kernel, as depicted in Figure 5b.
Notice that the price kernel needs not be decreasing in c in a model
with ambiguity aversion, contrary to the classical result holding for the EU
model. In particular, when the marginals can be ranked according to the
Rothschild-Stiglitz riskiness order, it may be possible that the price kernel
be increasing in c for large values of the GDP per capita c. T h i si sd u e
to the transfer of the implicit probability mass towards these states due to
ambiguity aversion. This is in line with a recent observation by Rosenberg
and Engle (2002) who computed the price kernel in the U.S.A. by using
28 
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Figure 5: The eﬀect of an increase in ambiguity aversion on the price kernel,
when the marginals can be ranked by the FSD order (a), or by the Rothschild-
Stiglitz riskiness order (b).
data on option prices. For low cs, they obtained an empirical price kernel
described by curve R-E in Figure 6 that is much more convex than could
be explained by the standard EU/CRRA model. Moreover, the price kernel
is locally increasing for intermediate values of c.F o r l a r g e r cs, π is again
decreasing and below what would be obtained by the EU/CRRA model.
Therefore, Rosenberg and Engle’s empirical price kernel can be explained by
the ambiguity aversion of the representative agent and by a set of marginals
that can be ranked according to the SSD order. Indeed, by Proposition 7,
the ambiguity aversion implies a SSD-deteriorating shift in the implicit state
probabilities, which would combine an increase in risk (shift from the classical
curve A-N to curve R-R), and a FSD-deteriorating shift in the range of large
c (shift from curve R-R to curve R-E).
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Figure 6: The Rosenberg and Engle (2002) empirical price kernel (R-E curve)
can be obtained from the classical decreasing one (A-N curve) by a sequence
of an increase in risk and a FSD-deteriorating shift.
9C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we explored the determinants of the demand for risky assets
and of asset prices when investors are ambiguity-averse. We have shown that,
contrary to the intuition, ambiguity aversion may yield an increase in the
demand for the risky and ambiguous asset, and a reduction in the demand
for the safe and unambiguous one. In the same fashion, it is not true in
general that ambiguity aversion raises the equity premium in the economy.
We have ﬁrst shown that the qualitative eﬀect of an increase in ambiguity
aversion in these settings is equivalent to that of a shift in the beliefs of the
investor in the standard EU model. If the set of plausible marginals can be
ranked according to the FSD order, this shift is FSD deteriorating, whereas it
is risk-increasing if these marginals can be ranked according to their riskiness.
30The problem originates from the observation already made by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1971) and Fishburn and Porter (1 9 7 6 )t h a taF S D / S S Dd e t e r i o r a t i n g
shift in the distribution of the return of the risky asset has an ambiguous
eﬀect on the demand for that asset in the EU framework. We relied on the
literature that emerged from this negative result to provide some suﬃcient
conditions for any increase in ambiguity aversion to yield a reduction in the
demand for the risky asset and an increase in the equity premium. We also
examined the eﬀect of ambiguity aversion on the price kernel.
31References
Athey, S.C., (2002), Monotone Comparative Statics Under Un-
certainty, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1) : 187-223.
Abel, A.B., (2002), An exploration of the eﬀects of optimism and
doubt on asset returns, Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 26, 1075-1092.
Black, J.M. and G. Bulkley, (1989), A Ratio Criterion for Signing
the Eﬀect of an Increase in Uncertainty, International Eco-
nomic Review, 30, 119-130.
CEC (Commission of the European Communities), (2000), Com-
munication from the commission on the Precautionary Prin-
ciple, see at www.europa.eu.int.
Chateauneuf, A. and G. Lakhnati, (2005), Increases in risk and
demand for risky asset, mimeo, University Paris 1.
Chen, Z;, and L. Epstein, (2002), Ambiguity, risk, and asset re-
turns in continuous time, Econometrica, 70, 1403-1443.
Cecchetti, S.G., P.-S. Lam and N.C. Mark, (2000), Asset pricing
with distorted beliefs: Are equity returns too good to be true?,
American Economic Review, 90, 787-805.
Dionne, G., L. Eeckhoudt and C. Gollier, (1993), Increases in
Risk and Linear Payoﬀs, International Economic Review,3 4 ,
309-319.
Dionne, G., and C. Gollier, (1992), Comparative Statics Under
Multiple Sources of Risk with Applications to Insurance De-
mand, T h eG e n e v aP a p e r so nR i s ka n dI n s u r a n c eT h e o r y ,1 7 .
32Dr` eze, J. H. (1981). “Inferring Risk Tolerance from Deductibles
in Insurance Contracts”, The Geneva Papers 6, 48-52.
Eeckhoudt, L., and C. Gollier, (1995), Demand for Risky Assets
and the Monotone Probability Ratio Order, Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty, 11, 113-122.
Eeckhoudt, L. and P. Hansen (1980), Minimum and maximum
prices, uncertainty and the theory of the competitive ﬁrm,
American Economic Review, Vol 70, 1064-1068.
Fishburn, P., and B. Porter, (1976), Optimal portfolios with one
safe and one risky asset: Eﬀects of changes in rate of return
and risk, Management Science, 22, 1064-73.
Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler, (1989), Maximin expected utility
with non-unique prior, J o u r n a lo fM a t h e m a t i c a lE c o n o m i c s ,
18, 141, 153.
Gollier, C., (1995), The Comparative Statics of Changes in Risk
Revisited, Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 522-535.
Gollier, C., (1997), A Note on Portfolio Dominance, Review of
Economic Studies, 64, 147-150.
Gollier, C., (2001a), Should we beware of the Precautionary Prin-
ciple?, Economic Policy, 16, 301-328.
Gollier, C., (2001b), The economics of risk and time, MIT Press,
Cambridge.
Gollier, C., B. Jullien and N. Treich, (2000), ScientiﬁcP r o g r e s s
and Irreversibility: An Economic Interpretation of the Pre-
cautionary Principle, Journal of Public Economics, 2000, 75,
229-53.
33Hadar, J. and T.K. Seo, (1990), The Eﬀe c t so fS h i f t si naR e t u r n
Distribution on Optimal Portfolios, International Economic
Review, 31, 721-736.
Hansen, L.P., T.J. Sargent, and T.D. Tallarini, (1999), Robust
permanent income and pricing, Review of Economic Studies,
66.
Kandel, S., and R.F. Stambaugh, (1991), Assets returns and in-
tertemporal preferences, Journal of Monetary Economics,2 7 ,
39-71.
Kimball, M.S., (1990), Precautionary savings in the small and in
the large, Econometrica, 58, 53-73.
Klibanoﬀ, P., M. Marinacci and S. Mukerji, (2005), A smooth
model of decision making under ambiguity, Econometrica 73(6),
1849-1892.
Landsberger, M, and I. Meilijson, (1990), Demand for risky ﬁnan-
cial assets: A portfolio analysis, Journal of Economic Theory,
50, 204-13.
Meyer, J. and M.B. Ormiston, (1985), Strong Increase in Risk and
Their Comparative Statics, International Economic Review,
26, 425-437.
Mukerji, S., K. Sheppard and J.-M. Tallon, (2005), Smooth am-
biguity aversion and equity premium, paper presented at the
RUD conference, Heidelberg.
O’Riordan, T. and J. Cameron, (1995) , Interpreting the Precau-
tionary Principle, Earthscan Publications, London.
34Ormiston, M. and E. Schlee, (1993), Comparative Statics Un-
d e rU n c e r t a i n t yf o raC l a s so fE c o n o m i cA g e n t s ,Journal of
Economic Theory, 61, 412-422.
Rosenberg, J.V., and R.F. Engle, (2002), Empirical pricing ker-
nel, Journal of Financial Economics, 64, 341-372.
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, (1970), Increasing Risk: I. A Def-
inition, Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 225-243.
Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J.E., (1971), Increasing Risk II: Its
Economic Consequences, Journal of Economic Theory,3 ,p p .
225-243.
Savage, L.J., (1954), The foundations of statistics,N e wY o r k :W i -
ley. Revised and Enlarged Edition, New York: Dover (1972).
35Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5
The following lemma is useful to prove Proposition 5. Let K denote
interval [minθ α∗
θ,maxθ α∗
θ], where α∗
θ is the maximand of Eu(w0 + αe xθ).
Lemma 3 Consider a speciﬁc set of marginals (e x1,...,e xn) and a concave util-
ity function u. They characterize function U deﬁned by U(α,θ)=Eu(w0 +
αe xθ). Consider a speciﬁcs c a l a rα∗
1 in K. The following two conditions are
equivalent:
1. Any agent φ2 that is more ambiguity-averse than agent φ1 with demand
α∗
1 for the risky asset will have a demand for the risky asset that is
smaller than α∗
1;
2. There exists θ ∈ {1,...,n} such that
U(α
∗
1,θ)Uα(α
∗
1,θ) ≥ U(α
∗
1,θ)Uα(α
∗
1,θ)( 3 0 )
for all θ ∈ {1,...,n}.
Proof: We ﬁrst prove that condition 2 implies condition 1. Consider an
agent φ2 = k(φ1) that is more ambiguity-averse than agent φ1, so that the
transformation function k is concave. The condition thus implies that
k
0(φ1(U(α
∗
1,θ)))Uα(α
∗
1,θ) ≤ k
0(φ1(U(α
∗
1,θ)))Uα(α
∗
1,θ)
for all θ. Multiplying both side of this inequality by qθφ1(U(α∗
1,θ)) ≥ 0a n d
summing up over all θ yields
n X
θ=1
qθφ
0
2(U(α
∗
1,θ))Uα(α
∗
1,θ) ≤ k
0(φ1(U(α
∗
1,θ)))
n X
θ=1
qθφ
0
1(U(α
∗
1,θ))Uα(α
∗
1,θ)=0 .
36The last equality comes from the assumption that agent φ1 selects portfolio
α∗
1. Thus, condition (16) is satisﬁed, thereby implying that α∗
2 is less than
α∗
1.
We then prove that condition 1 implies condition 2. Without loss of
generality, rank the θss u c ht h a tU(α∗
1,θ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nθ. By contradiction,
suppose that there exists a θ0 <nsuch that Uα(α∗
1,θ 0) ≥ 0a n dUα(α∗
1,θ 0 +
1) ≤ 0. Select a prior distribution (q1,...,qn)s ot h a tqθ =0f o ra l lθ except
for θ0 and θ0 + 1. Select qθ0 = q ∈ [0,1] so that
qφ
0
1(U(α
∗
1,θ 0))Uα(α
∗
1,θ 0)+( 1− q)φ
0
1(U(α
∗
1,θ 0 +1 ) ) Uα(α
∗
1,θ 0 +1 )=0 ,
(31)
so that agent φ1 selects portfolio α∗
1. Consider any concave transformation
function k. It implies that
n X
θ=1
qθφ
0
2(U(α
∗
1,θ))Uα(α
∗
1,θ)=qk
0(φ1(U(α
∗
1,θ 0)))φ
0
1(U(α
∗
1,θ 0))Uα(α
∗
1,θ 0)
+(1 − q)k
0(φ1(U(α
∗
1,θ 0 + 1)))φ
0
1(U(α
∗
1,θ 0 +1 ) ) Uα(α
∗
1,θ 0 +1 ) .
Because Uα(α∗
1,θ 0+1)≤ 0a n dk0(φ1(U(α∗
1,θ 0+1))) ≤ k0(φ1(U(α∗
1,θ 0))), this
is larger than
k
0(φ1(U(α
∗
1,θ 0)))[qφ
0
1(U(α
∗
1,θ 0))Uα(α
∗
1,θ 0)+( 1− q)φ
0
1(U(α
∗
1,θ 0 +1 ) ) Uα(α
∗
1,θ 0 +1 ) ]=0 .
It implies that condition (16) is violated, implying in turn that α∗
2 is larger
than α∗
1, a contradiction. ¥
In Figure 7, we draw an example for which condition 2 in Lemma 3 is
satisﬁed. If we rank the θ in such a way that U(α∗
1,θ) is monotone in θ, this
condition is essentially a single-crossing property of function Uα(α∗
1,θ). To
illustrate, suppose that u(z)=−A−1 exp(−Az)a n de xθ ∼ N(θ,σ2), which
implies that U(α,θ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nθ and is given by equation (2). It implies
that Uα(α,θ) has the same sign as θ−αAσ2. It implies in turn that condition
37θ 
U(α1
*
 ,θ) 
Uα(α1
*
 ,θ) 
θ  − 
Figure 7: An example for which condition 2 in the lemma is satisﬁed.
2i nL e m m a3i ss a t i s ﬁed with θ = αAσ2. Our Lemma implies that ambiguity
aversion reduces the demand for the risky asset in the CARA/Normal case.
This was shown in Section 2 in the special case of power φ functions.
We need to prove a second lemma in order to prepare for the proof of
Proposition 5.
Lemma 4 Suppose that e xb is centrally dominated by e xa.T h e n ,Ee xbu0(w0 +
αe xb) ≤ 0 for any α ≥ 0 such that Ee xau0(w0 + αe xa) ≤ 0 .
Proof: By assumption, there exists a positive scalar m such that Tb(x) ≤
mTa(x). Integrating by part, we have that
Ee xbu
0(w0 + αe xb)=
Z x+
x−
u
0(w0 + αx)xdFb(x)
= u
0(w0 + αx+)Tb(x+) − α
Z x+
x−
u
00
(w0 + αx)Tb(x)dx.
38This implies that
Ee xbu
0(w0 + αe xb) ≤ m
∙
u
0(w0 + αx+)Ta(x+) − α
Z x+
x−
u
00
(w0 + αx)Ta(x)dx
¸
= mEe xau
0(w0 + αe xa).
B ya s s u m p t i o n ,t h i si sn o n p o s i t i v e .¥
We can now prove Proposition 5.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :C o n d i t i o ne xθ ¹SSD e xθ+1 implies that U(α,θ +
1) ≥ U(α,θ), whereas, by Lemma 4, condition e xθ ¹CD e xθ+1 implies that
Uα(α,θ) ≤ 0w h e n e v e rUα(α,θ +1 ) ≤ 0. This latter result implies that
there exists a θ such that (θ − θ)Uα(α,θ) ≤ 0 for all θ.T h i s i m m e d i a t e l y
yields condition 2 in Lemma 3, which is suﬃc i e n tf o ro u rc o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c
property. ¥
39